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ABSTRACT
                 We develop a simple rational model of active portfolio management that provides a
natural benchmark against which to evaluate observed relationship between returns and fund flows.
We show that many effects widely regarded as anomalous are consistent with this simple
explanation. In the model, investments with active managers do not outperform passive benchmarks
because of the competitive market for capital provision, combined with decreasing returns to scale
in active portfolio management. Consequently, past performance cannot be used to predict future
returns, or to infer the average skill level of active managers. The lack of persistence in active
manager returns does not imply that differential ability across managers is nonexistent or
unrewarded, that gathering information about performance is socially wasteful, or that chasing
performance is pointless. A strong relationship between past performance and the ow of funds exists
in our model, indeed this is the market mechanism that ensures that no predictability in performance
exists. Calibrating the model to the fund flows and survivorship rates, we  nd these features of the
data are consistent with the vast majority (80%) of active managers having at least enough skill to
make back their fees.
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One of the central mysteries facing nancial economics is why nancial intermediaries appear
to be so highly rewarded in our economy, despite the apparent erce competition between
them and the uncertainty about whether they add value through their activities. Research
into mutual fund performance has provided evidence that deepens this puzzle. Since Jensen
(1968), studies have shown little evidence that mutual fund managers outperform passive
benchmarks.
More recently, attention has focused on the relationship between fund ows and perfor-
mance, and the lack of persistence in performance. This work has produced several ndings
that researchers have viewed as puzzling. The relative performance of mutual fund managers
appears to be largely unpredictable using past relative performance. While some controver-
sial evidence of persistence does exist (see Gruber (1996), Carhart (1997), Zheng (1999) and
Bollen and Busse (2001)) it is concentrated in low liquidity sectors or at shorter horizons.
Yet, mutual fund investors appear to chase performance. Flows into and out of mutual funds
are related to lagged measures of excess returns (see Chevalier and Ellison (1997) or Sirri
and Tufano (1998)).
Together, these regularities raise questions about the rationality of investors who place
money with active managers despite their apparent inability to outperform passive strate-
gies. For example, Daniel et al (1997) claim that \When a professional portfolio manager
proposes an investment strategy based on fundamental analysis of equities, the presumption
is that he or she expects the strategy to outperform simpler, purely mechanical, strategies
based on stock characteristics like book-to-market, size and momentum." Investors appear
to devote resources to evaluating past performance of managers and to choose portfolio
managers on that basis, even though future performance appears to be unrelated to past
performance. Thus, Bollen and Busse (2001, p. 1), argue, \The existence of the mutual fund
selection industry is predicated on the assumption that some mutual fund managers possess
signicant ability, and that this ability persists, allowing the astute investor to predict fu-
ture performance based on past results." Gruber (1996, p. 784), in his Presidential Address,
states, \If managerial ability exists and is not included in the price of open-end funds, then
performance should be predictable." Sirri and Tufano (1998) argue that since persistence in
performance is conned to certain sectors, the response of ows to performance should also
be strongest there.
The evidence that performance does not persist is widely regarded as implying that
superior performance is attributable to luck rather than dierential ability across managers.
Indeed, various researchers have interpreted this fact as evidence for \market eciency."
1For example Malkiel (1995, p. 571) concludes that the \study of mutual funds does not
provide any reason to abandon a belief that securities markets are remarkably ecient." In
their widely used text book, Ross, Westereld and Jae (2002, p. 353) explain that if the
market is \ecient in the semistrong form" average active mutual fund returns should be
be the same as the market as whole. They then continue: \the nding that they [active
fund managers] do not outperform the market indices is consistent with semistrong-form
and weak-form eciency." The implication is that stocks are so well priced that not even the
best active managers can consistently make money by using their superior ability. From an
economic point of view, this implication, were it true, would be troubling. Clearly, the most
talented active managers have abilities that are in short supply that could be productively
deployed in other activities. One would think these managers would choose to apply their
talents in areas where they would reap the highest rewards. If all performance is due to luck,
there should be no reason to reward these talents. Yet, in reality, managers appear to reap
rich rewards from superior past performance.
In the face of this evidence many researchers have concluded that a consistent explanation
of these regularities is impossible without appealing to behavioral arguments that depend
on irrationality, or to elaborate theories based on asymmetric information or moral hazard.
Yet the one thing that has been missing from this debate is a clear delineation of what
a fully rational model with no moral hazard or asymmetric information implies about the
characteristics of active portfolio managers. Before appealing to these additional eects we
believe it makes sense to rst establish which behaviors in the data are qualitatively and
quantitatively consistent with more direct explanations.
Our simple model of active portfolio management and fund ows provides a natural
benchmark against which to evaluate observed returns, ows and performance outcomes
in this important sector of the nancial services industry. Using this model we show that
the eects discussed above are generally consistent with a fully rational and competitive
market for capital investment and rational, self-interested choices by fund managers who
have dierential ability to generate abnormal returns.
The paper's main insights are as follows. The fact that investments with active managers
do not outperform passive benchmarks is a consequence of the competitiveness in the market
for capital investment. If investors compete with each other for superior returns, they end
up ensuring that none exist. A consequence of this insight is that the average skill level of
all active managers cannot be inferred from their overall past performance: the fact that
as a group they do not outperform passive managers need not imply that they lack skill.
Furthermore, the lack of persistence does not imply that dierential ability across managers
is unrewarded, that gathering information about performance is socially wasteful, or that
2chasing performance is pointless. It merely implies the provision of capital to the mutual
fund industry is competitive.
Competition between investors implies a lack abnormal performance on average and a lack
of persistence in performance. Yet this result is not inconsistent with a strong relationship
between performance and ow of funds. On the contrary, the strong relationship between
performance and ow of funds is the mechanism that ensures that there is no predictability
in performance.
In our model performance is not persistent precisely because investors chase performance
and make full, rational, use of information about funds' histories in doing so. In any given
period, high performance is rationally interpreted by investors as evidence of the manager's
superior ability, so new money ows to the fund to the point that expected excess returns
going forward are competitive. This process necessarily implies that investors cannot expect
to make positive excess returns going forward, which implies that superior performance
cannot be predictable. Thus, the response of funds ow to performance is simply evidence
that capital ows to investments where it is most productive.
As is standard in models of corporation nance, capital is supplied with perfect elasticity
to managers whose dierential ability allows them to identify positive net present value
opportunities. Since these opportunities, or the ability to identify them, are the resource that
is ultimately in scarce supply, the economic rents thus created ow through to the managers
who create them, not to the investors who invest in them. In eect, the implication is
precisely the opposite of Sirri and Tufano's intuition cited above. Any predictability in active
manager's returns is evidence of a lack of competition in that sector|capital ows to that
sector are not suciently immediate to compete away all the rents. Ceteris paribus, sectors
with predictability should be associated with a smaller, rather than a larger, response of
capital ows to performance. Similarly, the observed behaviors are quite consistent with the
existence of skilled managers with dierential ability. By calibrating our model to observed
fund ows and survival rates reported in the literature, we show that the data on active
mutual funds is consistent with the presence of signicant managerial skill. Indeed, we nd
a surprisingly high level of skill|80% of managers have at least enough skill to make back
their fees.
Our model is related to several recent papers, though none of these are directly aimed
at reconciling the lack of return persistence with the responsiveness of ows to past perfor-
mance. Bernhardt, Davies, and Westbrook (2002) study short-term return persistence in a
model where privately informed managers trade to maximize funds under management. The
response of funds to performance in their model, however, is exogenous. In our model, the
ow-performance relationship is endogenous, and consistent with no persistence in perfor-
3mance. Lynch and Musto (2002) endogenize the ow of funds in a two-period setting, where,
as in our paper, investors and managers learn about manager's abilities and the protability
of their strategies from past returns. In their model dierences in ability lead to persistent
dierences in performance. We show rational learning and strong response of ows to per-
formance can be consistent with weak persistence in performance, or none at all. Nanda,
Narayan and Warther (2000) develop a three-date model with heterogeneous managerial
ability. They use the model to derive endogenously heterogeneous fee structures involving
loads as managers compete for clients with dierent expected liquidity needs. In their model
managerial ability is known, so there is no role for learning about managerial ability, and
the response of the ow of funds to it. These are central concerns in out paper. Finally,
in a corporate setting, Holmstr om (1999) considers a dynamic multi-period moral-hazard
problem in which learning about managerial ability is very similar to that in our model.
He characterizes the resulting optimal contract. Our goals are very dierent. There is no
moral hazard or asymmetric information in our model, so the simple compensation scheme
we consider is optimal, funds are allocated eciently across managers, and all outcomes are
rst-best.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we motivate the paper by outlining
a very simple thought experiment that communicates the intuition that underlies our model.
In Section 3, we derive the model and introduce a simple parametric example that allows us,
subsequently, to quantatively characterize our results. We then use the model to characterize
mutual fund survivorship in Section 4, along with the ow of funds and performance relations,
life-cycle characteristics of funds, and the unobserved distribution of managerial ability in
Section 5. Section 6 is the conclusion.
2 The Argument
We begin by considering a simple thought experiment. Imagine an economy with full infor-
mation. Skilled investment managers exist who can generate positive, risk-adjusted, excess
returns. Managers and investors alike know who these managers are. What would the
returns these managers provide to investors look like?
In equilibrium, investors who choose to invest with active managers cannot expect to
receive positive excess returns on a risk-adjusted basis. If they did, there would be an excess
supply of capital to those managers. Every investor in the economy who held assets of
equivalent risk would want to sell those assets and invest with the active manager instead.
Markets can only clear when the expected return to investors in these funds equals the
4expected return in alternative investment opportunities. That is, the risk-adjusted expected
excess return to investing with a skilled active manager must be zero.
If skill or superior ability in active portfolio management could be deployed at an arbi-
trarily large scale without dissipating its eectiveness, then in a given risk class all funds
in this hypothetical world would ow to the manager with the highest ability. That is, one
manager would end up managing all the available investment capital leaving the manager
with no investors to trade with, which contradicts the assumption that the manager can earn
excess returns.
In light of the above argument, we assume that managerial ability to generate excess
returns cannot be eectively employed at an arbitrarily large scale. Certainly, this is more
consistent with the observed decentralization of the professional money management indus-
try. If there are decreasing returns to scale in the use of managerial ability, funds will
be invested with skilled managers to the point where the manager provides investors with
expected returns equal to those available in passive alternatives.
This also suggests a mechanism the skilled manager can use to capture the rents in this
idealized economy. He can manage a large fund and charge a fee that is proportional to
the amount of assets under management. With this incentive scheme, investment will ow
into the fund until the fund is so large that the risk-adjusted expected excess return is zero.
Highly skilled managers will manage larger funds, earn more in fees, and extract more rents.
Note that in this economy investors earn the same returns in active and passive invest-
ments of the same riskiness and all returns are unpredictable. If there is cross-sectional
variation in skill level, more funds ow to the higher skilled managers. Although the size
of the fund is correlated with management ability, neither fund size nor management ability
predicts investor returns. In this static environment there are no dynamics to the ow of
funds.
Next consider a more realistic economy in which neither investors nor managers them-
selves can separate good managers from bad. In this case participants will infer ability
from past returns. Investors initially will invest to the point that the expected excess risk-
adjusted return from placing funds with a typical manager is zero. Subsequently, the lucky
investors who happened to pick the skilled managers will earn superior returns. As time
passes, however, and managers build a track record, dierential skill levels among managers
become apparent. Investors react by increasing their investment with the skilled managers,
which allows these managers to extract more economic rents by collecting fees on assets un-
der management. Learning from past returns, however, does not change the insight that in
equilibrium the ow funds ensures that investors do not expect to earn excess returns going
forward. The expected return to investors is always the same. Conditional on perceived skill
5level, the risk-adjusted expected excess return to investing is zero.
In the second economy, since investors infer management skill from past returns, the
ow of funds will be driven by managers' past returns. Nevertheless, all risk-adjusted excess
returns are unpredictable. The response of the ow of funds to past returns, coupled with
unpredictable future returns, is not a sign of investor irrationality. Returns are unpredictable
because funds ow rationally in response to past returns.
Although this verbal discussion captures the basic intuition, there are implications of this
theory that only a formal model can deliver. The rest of this paper, therefore, formalizes
the argument and explores some of these implications.
3 The Model
In this section we introduce a simple model that allows us to solve recursively for the re-
lationship between performance and the ow of funds. We assume that a population of
active mutual fund managers constructs investment portfolios from the primitive assets in
the economy. Investors reward managers by paying a xed percent of assets under manage-
ment every period. Mutual fund managers have heterogeneous ability to identify mispriced
assets and generate superior performance.
All participants in the model are symmetrically informed. Managerial ability is unknown
to both managers and investors, and they learn about this ability by observing the history
of the managed portfolio's returns. The costs managers face are also common knowledge.
We will assume a manager's ability to achieve superior performance is limited to the
idiosyncratic portion of the portfolio. That is, we rule out cases where superior ability
derives from ability to predict the outcome of systematic uncertainty, and develop the model
assuming that investors are all risk neutral. It is possible to embed the model in a more
general one where investors are risk averse and active managers bear systematic risk as
follows. Note that an investor's decision on the level of riskiness of his portfolio can be made
separately from his decision to chase highly skilled managers, as long as \skill" does not
involve market timing. A risk averse investor can rst decide on what level of systematic
risk is optimal. He can then look for skilled managers and invest with them, maintaining the
same level of systematic risk by trading passive alternatives. So long as the investor knows
the systematic risk of the manager's portfolio, he can adjust his own levels of systematic
risk to ensure that his overall exposure remains the same once the investment with the
skilled manager is made. Since the systematic risk held by the manager is irrelevant to
the investor's decision, we can assume that managers hold none|their portfolios consist of
6purely idiosyncratic risk. Investors evaluate this risk as if they were risk neutral.
Instead of placing funds with an active manager, investors can purchase passively man-
aged portfolios, which we refer to as \the passive benchmarks." These investments are
available to all participants, including managers, with no costs or fees. They have an ex-
pected excess return equal zero (i.e., the expected return is the risk free rate). If investing in
a managed fund, given available information, has positive expected excess returns, investors
will supply capital to the fund with innite elasticity. If the expected excess return of the
fund is less than zero, investors will withdraw their money from the fund.
Managers act at every date to maximize fees, which in this setting will be equivalent to
maximizing assets under management. Since, in equilibrium, assets under management will
be increasing in expected returns, managers also attempt at every date to earn as high an
expected return as possible and thus increase ows. The model is structured to preclude
complicated dynamic strategies through which managers could manipulate investors' per-
ceptions of their expected return. There is empirical evidence of such strategic behavior
by managers in Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997), who
show that managers with good performance early in the year tend to reduce risk later, and
those with bad performance do the reverse. While these agency issues are clearly of some
importance, we believe it makes sense to ask rst whether a simple, symmetric information
model can the broader features of the performance-ow relationships.
To achieve high returns management must identify undervalued securities and trade to
exploit this knowledge without moving the price adversely. To do this managers must expend
resources and must pay bid-ask spreads that diminish the return available to pay out to
investors. We assume these costs are independent of ability and are increasing in the size
of the fund. While the manager faces increasing marginal costs of managing those funds
he manages actively, he is free to invest any additional funds he can attract in the passive
benchmark and avoid these costs. This will imply that there will be an optimal amount of
money that he will actively manage. Funds in excess of this will be invested in the passive
benchmark. Since he collects fees on these additional funds, they are a means through which
he extracts rents associated with his superior ability.
Investors know the cost structure faced by the manager, and the amount of money under
management. Accordingly, they can infer the manager's actions. They continue to supply
funds to the manager because at the margin it allows them to participate in the excess returns
attributable to the manager's ability. As the manager expands the scale of the fund, he will
eventually earn the expected return that is available to investors in passive alternatives, and
thus the fund becomes unattractive net of fees.
Let qat denote the funds being actively managed, and qIt the funds the manager indexes.
7The total funds under management are denoted qt = qat + qIt. We take the standard
compensation contract in the mutual fund industry. The manager charges a fee of f per
dollar managed. As we discuss later, there is no moral hazard in this model, and so this
contract is optimal in the sense that it leads to rst-best investment decisions. For simplicity,
we restrict attention to funds without loads (exit and entry costs). The presence of loads
has been attributed to manager's desire to separate investors with dierent liquidity needs
(see Chordia (1996) and Nanda, Narayan and Warther (2000)), which is not a focus of this
paper.
The manager incurs xed costs of F each period he is in operation. These costs include
overhead and any opportunity costs for management time. The xed costs are not a function
of the strategy, whether active or passive, adopted by the manager. Active management
triggers additional variable costs, and these costs are increasing and convex in the funds
under active management. Denote the variable costs incurred when actively managing qat
funds as C(qat)  0, where C(0) = 0 and C(q) < q;8q. Since we assume that there are
decreasing returns to scale, C0(q) > 0;8q. To ensure a bounded solution, we also further
assume that for every q, C00(q) > 0 and limq!1 C0(q) > 1. These assumptions capture the
notion that with a suciently large fund a manager will spread his information gathering
activities too thin, or that larger transaction costs are imposed by market makers increasing
their spreads.
We model dierential ability by placing structure on the return the manager could earn
absent costs and fees. Note that this is not the return actually earned by investors in the
fund. That will be net of costs and fees. For a fund at date t,
Rt =  + et
denotes the excess return of the actively managed funds absent any costs or fees. One could
think of this return as the return the manager makes on the rst dollar he manages, before
any costs or fees are incurred. The parameter  is unknown to both the managers and the
market, and is the source of dierential ability across managers. The errors, et, are normally
distributed with mean zero and variance 2. They are independently distributed through
time. Denote the precision of the errors as ! = 1
2. Investors learn about  by observing the
realized excess returns the manager produces. This learning is the source of the relationship
between performance and the ow of funds.
The excess total payout, over what would be earned on the passive benchmark, to in-
8vestors in the fund will be:
TPt+1 = qatRt+1   C(qat)   (qat + qIt)f:




















denotes the unit cost associated with investing in the actively managed fund. The return rt
corresponds to the return empirically observed.
Investors supply funds with innite elasticity to investment opportunities that have pos-
itive excess expected returns. At each point in time, then, funds ow to each fund so that
the expected return going forward is zero:
Et(rt+1) = 0: (3)
Clearly, this implies there is no predictability or persistence in fund returns. We next derive
the manager's optimal decision rule.
3.1 The Manager's Decision Problem
For a manager to choose to go into the mutual fund business, it must be his best available
employment opportunity. Under our assumptions, the value of entering the mutual fund
business is an increasing function of the initial amount of money under management. Thus,
a fund size, q0, will exist, such that for all fund sizes larger than this, money management is
the manager's best available opportunity.
We do not model the source of the market's priors about managers. This is presumably
based on observable characteristics, such as those studied by Chevalier and Ellison (1999).1
We simply assume that the market's prior is that the manager's ability, , is normally
distributed with variance 2. If the information that shapes investors' expectations about
managers evolves continuously, managers will go into business the rst time investors' are
1These authors show that the average SAT scores of the manager's undergraduate institution does have
modest ability to predict performance.
9willing to provide q0 in funds. We assume that this occurs when the prior expectation of the
manager's ability is 0. To summarize, the priors for new managers regarding their ability,
, is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2. The precision of the prior will be
denoted  = 1
2.
We further assume that there are non-recurring xed costs associated with setting up a
mutual fund. Such costs include, but are not limited to, the cost to the manager of convincing
investors of his ability despite having no track record. This implies that the opportunity cost
of opening a fund is greater than the opportunity cost of continuing to operate. Accordingly,
there will also be a minimal ecient scale of operation for the fund,  q, with  q < q0. If qt <  q,
the manager will be unable to cover his xed costs, F, and the fund will shut down.
Consider a fund in the cohort that began operating at date 0. The funds under man-
agement are observable, and the cost function is common knowledge. Investors update their
posteriors based on the history of observed returns as Bayesians. Let
t  E(Rt+1 j R1;:::;Rt);





The timing convention is as follows. The fund enters period t with qt 1 funds under man-
agement and estimate of managerial ability t 1. Managers and investors observe rt (from
which they can infer Rt), and update their estimate of the manager's ability by calculating
t. Then funds ow into or out of the fund to determine qt.
Managers act to maximize total fees, subject to the constraint that the expected return
per dollar invested is no less than what investors could earn on their own by indexing. Finally,
we rule out borrowing or short positions in the passive benchmark. This also excludes the
possibility that the manager can borrow to cover operating costs, and thus experiment to
build a track record. It is descriptive of open-ended mutual funds, which have been the focus
of most of the empirical work on the ow of funds. Consequently, the manager will shut
down the fund if his fees fail to cover his xed costs, F.
Formally, the manager solves:
max
qat;qIt
(qat + qIt)f (5)
s:t:
EtfTPt+1g = qatt   C(qat)   (qat + qIt)f  0 (6)
10(qat + qIt)f  F (7)
qat  0 (8)
qIt  0: (9)
The rst constraint in the manager's problem, (6), ensures the fund is viable from the
investors' perspective: it oers a competitive return. The second constraint, (7), requires it
to be viable from the manager's viewpoint: he is able to cover his xed cost. The last two
constraints rule out borrowing and short positions.
3.2 The Manager's Policies
We now analyze the solution to this problem, derive an expression for the unit cost function,
c(qt), and characterize the ow of funds.
The left-hand side of the investor participation constraint, (6), is decreasing in the total
funds under management, while both the objective function and the xed cost recover con-
straint (7) are increasing in this quantity. Thus, the investor participation constraint will


















where we have used qt = q
at + q
It.
By inspection it is obvious that the investor participation constraint, (6), will never be
met with qat = 0;qIt > 0. At any non-zero solution, then, there are two possibilities for the
optimal quantities, q
at;q
It. Either both are positive or q
at > 0;q
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t are the Lagrange multipliers for the participation constraint (6) and xed
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f . This function is strictly increasing, and hence invertible, by the
convexity of the costs since G0 =
q
fC00 > 0. The existence of q
at is guaranteed because
G(0) = 0 (since C(0) = 0) and limq!1G(q) = 1 (since G(q) > qC0(q)   q = q(C0(q)   1)
and limq!1 C0(q) > 1). Equation (16) denes q
at in terms of qt. That is, knowing qt alone
allows observers to infer q
at, because the cost structure is also known.
The manager will invest in the actively managed strategy to the point where the marginal
cost is equal to the excess expected return, (14). Substituting q





It = qt   q

at
= qt   G
 1(qt) (17)
When the manager is constrained because the non-negativity constraint (9) binds so
that q
It = 0, the participation constraint will determine the maximum amount of funds
the manager can attract and still give investors their reservation expected return. Setting
q





where the second equality follows from (2). So in this case the per unit cost equals the excess
return.
Whether or not the manager is constrained by (9) depends on the amount of money
under management. There is a critical level qc, such that whenever qt > qc, q
It > 0. To
determine qc, we simply solve for the level of qt such that in the unconstrained problem, the
manager chooses to set q





Finally we need to consider the case when it is uneconomical to run the fund, that is,
q
at = 0 and q
It = 0. This case occurs whenever the total fees collected by the manager do
12not exceed the xed costs, and (7) cannot be satised. This will occur whenever




So there will be a minimal ecient scale of the fund, which we denote  q = F
f . Whenever qt
drops below  q the fund goes out of business. Note that if there are additional costs associ-
ated with going into the mutual fund business initially, q0 >  q. The following proposition
summarizes the manager's decision rule.
Proposition 1 Let the maximum amount of capital a manager can raise at time t be denoted
qt and let qc solve (19). Then if qt < F







qt if qt < qc
G 1(qt) o:w:
(20)







0 if qt < qc
qt   G 1(qt) o:w:
(21)
The manager's choice can be described as follows. To stay in business he must have
enough assets under management to simultaneously cover his xed costs and ensure investors
an expected excess return of at least zero. Assuming that this is possible, the manager
would like to set the level of funds in active management such that marginal costs equals his
expected return. If he does reach this level of active management, putting more money into
active management is suboptimal. He is better o indexing the additional money and thus
avoiding the trading or information gathering costs. In some cases he cannot raise enough
funds to ensure that the marginal costs of active management equals his expected return
because at this level of assets, expected excess returns to investors are negative. By reducing
the amount of assets under management, and thus the costs incurred, the return to investors
is raised.
In this form, the model also suggests that the (idiosyncratic) risk characteristics of funds
should evolve through time. As managers establish that they have ability, they attract
more funds, but their portfolios become more like the passive benchmarks. When active
management involves taking higher idiosyncratic risks, then younger funds will tend to be
the ones taking more of this kind of risk, and will tend to be the extreme performers.
133.3 Contract Optimality
The assumed managerial compensation contract is optimal in that it leads to rst-best,
ecient investment. This might seem surprising in that the contract does not depend directly
on performance. There is no moral hazard or asymmetric information in this model, however.
The manager's allocation of funds, qt, between active and passive investments, qat;qIt, is
assumed to be observable to the market and enters directly in constraint (6). Formally,
this means that there is no incentive compatibility constraint in the manager's problem.
Maximizing the total return to the portfolio, through (6), increases the total fees the manager
can earn. Thus, the incentives associated with the fee structure in our model are not in any
way distortionary.
This is not a model of \closet indexing," because the manager's choices are transparent
and can be directly contracted upon. The allocation of capital across managers is ecient,
and outcomes are rst-best. Managers are providing a valuable service. They expand their
actively managed portfolio to the point where marginal benets equal marginal costs. The
extra funds they attract beyond this level would otherwise be invested in passive alternatives
in any case. The extra funds contribute to higher compensation for the manager, of course,
but not ineciently. Alternatively, managers could simply choose the optimal level for active
management, q
at, close to the fund to additional ows, and charge dierential fees based on
past history.
Undoubtedly, investors would prefer an environment where they shared in the benets
derived from managerial ability. Managerial talent, however, is the resource in scarce supply.
As in most models in corporation nance, the manager extracts the net present value of his
services. Since those services are eciently deployed, within the broader class of repeated
single-period contracts the compensation scheme we assume is optimal.
Absent moral hazard or asymmetric information, the only reason multiperiod contracts
might lead to superior outcomes would involve more ecient risk sharing. If there are
dierences in risk aversion between managers and investors then multiperiod contracts, if
they are enforceable, can improve risk sharing. This would require multiperiod contracts to
be enforceable|managers and investors would need to be forced to work or invest when it
would be suboptimal to do so. If both parties are free to recontract at each point, then the
multiperiod contracts would collapse into a sequence of one-period contract such as ours.
Intertemporal commitment to such a contracts might be dicult to enforce on the manager's
side. It may or may not be dicult to enforce on the investors' side, through loads or other
devices. In any case, optimal intertemporal risk sharing is not the focus of our analysis.
143.4 Fund Dynamics
In Section 3.2 we showed that the fund will only continue to operate when qt   q. Note
that the amount investors are willing to invest at time t is determined by t, using (11).
This implies that there exists a   such that investors will only be willing to invest more
than  q when t >  . Any time t drops below this value, the fund shuts down and investors
withdraw all funds.























qt + f if qt < qc
C(G 1(qt))
qt + f o:w:
(23)













We can use these expressions to obtain a simple recursive expression for the relationship
between the ow of funds and performance.
Proposition 2 The evolution of t and the change in the amount of money under manage-
ment at any date, as a function of the prior performance, is the solution to


















t      0: (27)
Otherwise, qt = 0.
Proof: It is straightforward to show from DeGroot (1970) (Theorem 1, p. 167), that the
15mean of investor's posteriors will satisfy the following recursion:
t =






where 0 is the mean of the initial prior. Next, use (24), evaluated at both t and t   1 to
substitute for t and t 1 in this expression. Finally, use the fact that the realized return
is given by rt = h(qt 1)Rt   c(qt 1) (combining equations (1) and (22)) to substitute for Rt.
These substitutions yield the desired result. QED
The dierence equation (26) that gives the relationship between performance and funds
ow is very simple, and yet it clearly can match several features of fund ows. First, a smaller
t increases the weight on rt, so ows to younger funds respond much more dramatically to
performance than ows to more mature funds. Investors learn more with each observation.
The relationship will also be nonlinear because under our assumptions the cost function is
nonlinear. Finally, in the cross section for a given cohort, fund ow will be particularly
responsive to extremely bad performance, simply because it causes investors to withdraw all
their funds.
4 Survival Probabilities
Survival bias in mutual funds has been an important area of empirical investigation. Clearly,
empirical studies that ignore funds that failed will have biased estimates of the expected
returns for the surviving funds (see, for example, Carhart et al (2001)). More importantly,
the survival rates themselves communicate information about the abilities of active managers.
For example, one could examine the hypothesis that no skilled managers exist by comparing
the t of our model with  = 0 to its performance with parameters of the prior distribution
freely estimated. Survival rates are natural moments to focus on in such a test. With this
in mind we derive explicit expressions for the survival rates in the model.
Note that Proposition 2 implies that a fund goes out of business whenever t s <  ;s =
1;:::;t   1. Thus, we can compute the unconditional probability that a fund will survive
t years by calculating the probability that t   . We begin by conditioning on the true
ability of the manager. Let the (unconditional) probability that a fund manager with ability
 survives t periods be denoted Pt(). The next proposition derives an expression for this
probability:
Proposition 3 Suppose a manager begins operating when the market's prior on her ability









t (), the density, conditional on management ability  of t over the region t   ,
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0) + 0) and n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Pr[t  ] = Pr
h
t   j 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Pr[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]
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 j t 1   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Dierentiating this expression with respect to , and thus eliminating the inner integral,
gives the density in the proposition. The expression of Pt() then follows immediately.








where R1 is distributed Normal[;
q
1








The objects of study in the empirical literature are the overall survival rates in the data.
It is now a simple matter to derive the unconditional probability that a fund will survive t
periods:






















Proof: Recall that the prior distribution for  is Normal with mean 0 and precision ,




















The density Ft() will be important in subsequent analysis. It gives the distribution of
the  in period t for a manager with unknown ability who is still operating in period t.
A number of researchers have demonstrated that track record, beyond the most recent
return, is an empirical determinant of survival.2 The role of learning in our model gives such
a result.
For any given fund of age t   1 with assets under management qt 1, there exists a level
of performance, denoted  r(qt 1), such that if rt is below this level, investors withdraw all
funds. This critical realization can be determined by nding the rt such that assets under










2See Brown and Goetzmann (1995) and Carhart et al (2001).
18Proposition 5 The conditional probability that a fund of age t   1 and size qt 1 survives























is a Normal distribution with mean zero and precision
!
(h(qt 1))2.
Proof: From (1), (3) and the distribution of Rt, rt is distributed normally with mean zero
and precision !
(h(qt 1))2. The result now follows directly from the fact that the probability of
survival is the probability that rt >  r(qt 1). QED
Undertaking the recursive substitution in (26), will give the relation between the critical














Substituting this into (31) and simplifying yields





















so the critical level,  r(qt 1), can be written as a function of the history of past returns. This
implies that fund survival will depend on past performance and age, or alternatively on the
current size of the fund and age.
5 Solutions for a Parametric Cost Function
The equilibrium zero-prot condition in our model gives a one-to-one mapping from t to
qt. This means that Ft() from Proposition 4 also implies the distribution of qt. These facts
allow us to analytically derive unconditional relation between performance and ows, and
compare these to the ndings in the literature, such as the plots based on non-parametric
estimates in Chevalier and Ellison (1997).
To derive an explicit expression linking performance to ows, we must pick a functional
form for the cost structure. Assume C(q) = aq2, so the variable cost function is quadratic.
19We will further assume that the constraint q
It  0 never binds. We derive necessary condi-
tions for this below. The extension to the general case is straightforward, but tedious, and


























Substituting (36) into (24) and solving provides the relation between market expectations






To justify the assumption that q
It > 0 it must be the case that  q > qc. Since the xed
cost constraint, (7), is binding at  q, this implies that the interior solution will always be












Substituting and simplifying provides the following condition on primitives that guarantees
























Using Proposition 2, (35), and (36), (38) after some simplication, yields the following
expression for the ow of funds as a function of the manager's performance so long as the



















Note, the ow of funds is zero at an excess return of zero. This suggests the empirically
observed shape characteristics of the ow of funds to performance relationship. Because
of the quadratic relationship between funds ow and excess return, funds respond more
dramatically to extreme performance than to mediocre performance. While this quadratic
behavior slows down the response to extreme negative performance, that will be oset in the
cross section by funds closing when performance is extremely bad. That is, for rt negative
enough, the ow of funds is simply  qt. Notice also that while age, t, and size, qt, will tend
to be correlated, they work in opposite directions on the absolute ow of funds. The absolute
ow of funds is proportional to the size of the fund, so the ow of funds when expressed as
a percentage, is independent of the fund size. Age, however, is still important, and since
older funds will tend to be larger, if the age of the fund is not controlled for, then percentage
change in the ow of funds will be more sensitive for smaller funds. The rest of this section is
devoted to deriving explicit expressions for the cross-sectional relation between performance
and the ow of funds.
Either the ow of funds responds continuously to rt, or rt is so bad that investors withdraw
all the funds. As we saw in the previous section, the latter will occur for any rt below a critical
realization. However, in this section it is more convenient to write the critical realization as
a function of t rather than qt. Denote this critical realization as r(t 1). It is determined
by nding the rt such that the market's posterior on the manager's ability falls to  . Using
equation (25), this value is given by solving:
r
(t 1) = (    t 1)h(qt 1)
 + t!
!
Substituting from (35) and (37), and simplifying, gives
r
(t 1) = 2(







21When rt is below r(t 1) the percentage change in assets is -100%. When rt is above
r(t 1), (43) can be used to determine the ow of funds. In summary then the overall































Empirical studies, however, commonly consider the ow of new funds, that is, the percentage
change in new assets, which is typically dened to be
































Note that this measure uses qt 1 in the denominator rather than qt 1(1+rt). Unfortunately,
this denition distorts the implications of very large negative returns that cause liquidation
of the fund. For any rt < r(t), qt = 0 and
qt qt 1(1+rt)
qt 1 =  (1 + rt). That is, under this
denition, for these returns, the measure becomes less responsive the worse the performance.
In the limit when rt =  100%, the measure gives no response in the ow of funds. In an
eort to address this issue while still maintaining consistency with the empirical estimates
for other returns, we set our measure of the ow of funds equal to  1 whenever liquidation
occurs.
For a given negative realization of rt, we can derive the set of funds that will liquidate
from (44). That is, all funds for which
rt < r
















f this inequality is always satised (since    t 1), so the fund




































22then for a given negative realization of rt, all funds with t 1 < (rt) are liquidated.
Empiricists have studied the reaction of the ow of funds to returns by conditioning on
funds' ages. To generate the analogous theoretical relation in our model, we aggregate over
all funds with the same age. Using (46), the expected ow of funds for a fund of age t,













































Since (r) <   for any r > 0, the ow of funds is quadratic for any positive excess return.
When excess return are negative, the ow of funds is no longer quadratic, for very large
negative returns it converges to -100%.
From (47) it is clear that larger fees imply less sensitivity. Fund age also attenuates fund
sensitivity. Figure 1 plots the ow of funds relationship for funds of dierent ages. The
shapes of the relation between performance and ows are reminicent of what researchers
have found empirically (see, for example, Chevalier and Ellison (1997, Fig. 1)).
5.1 Evolution of Fund Volatility
Consider the volatility of funds' returns as a function of the assets under management. The
return to investors is given by
rt+1 =
qatRt+1   C(qat)   (qat + qIt)f
qt
: (48)
The conditional variance of this return is therefore
vart(rt+1) = vart
 
















where the t subscript denotes that the variance is conditional on funds currently under
management, qt. Assuming that managers have quadratic variable costs, using (16) and













Figure 1: Flow of New Funds as a Function of Return: The curves plot the response
in the ow of new funds to the previous period's return (i.e., equation (47)). The steepest curve
shows the response for a 2 year old fund (i.e., the return is from year 2 to year 3). The remaining
curves show the response for a 5, 10 and 20 year old fund respectively. The parameter values used
are as follows:  = 0:03;   = 0:065;f = 0:015; = 277 and ! = 25.


















The conditional volatility is a decreasing function of the size of the fund or the perceived
skill of the manager. Since past positive returns increase the size of the fund, the volatility
of the fund will decrease. The opposite occurs with negative returns. Thus, the model
delivers the relation between risk and past performance that has been attributed in past
research to attempts by managers to mislead investors. In our model, funds with superior
past performance invest a larger portion of their new capital in passive strategies and thus
lower their overall volatility. Similarly, funds with poor performance increase their volatility
because as funds ow out, they preferentially liquidate capital that was allocated to passive
strategies.
5.2 Comparison to Empirical Results
An important question in nancial economics is whether active portfolio managers have skill.
Our model allows us to address this question, in part, by asking what the distribution of
skills across managers would have to look like to generate observed outcomes in a rational
model such as ours. That is the objective of this section.
We proceed by rst tying down the model parameters that can be inferred directly from
existing evidence. The parameters that govern the distribution of skill level (0 and ) are
then inferred by matching two moments we have derived closed from expression for|the
survival probabilities and the ow of funds.
The parameter f is reasonably straightforward x through past empirical studies of mu-
tual funds. We use f = 1:5%. This is a bit higher than the averages reported in the literature
for the expense ratio. For example, Chen and Pennacchi (2002) report average expense ratios
for the funds in their study of 1.14%. Our use of a slightly higher number is intended to
account for the amortized loads that are not included in the expense ratio. We set  at 20%
based on a reasonable estimate of historical levels of portfolio volatility. We impose (40) as
an equality to ensure that at any quantity where the rm operates, it also invests in the
passive benchmark to some degree. From combining (37) and (38) we get that   = 2f = 3%.
These parameter values are summarized in Table 1 below. It straightforward to see (using
(30) and (47)) that the only remaining parameters that aect the survival probabilities and
ow of funds relationship are 0 and .
Our approach is to match the two parameters governing the distribution of skill level
25Variable Symbol Value
Percentage fee f 1.5%
Prior precision  277
(Prior stan. dev.) () (6%)
Return precision ! 25
(Return stand. dev.) () (20%)
Mean of prior 0 6.5%
Exit mean   3%
Table 1: Parameter Values
using an \eyeball metric" that matches the empirical survival rates and relation between the
ow of funds and performance. Table 1 contains the estimates of 0 and  that resulted
from this process. Before discussing these estimates, we report the details of this moment
matching process.
The lighter bars in Figure 2 represent quantity-weighted averages of survival rates for all
funds in the CRSP mutual fund data base from 1969 to 1999. That is, each year a certain
number of new funds appeared in the data base, and a certain fraction of these survived
for one, two,..., or nineteen years. The numbers in the gure weight these fractions by the
number of funds starting in that year relative to the number of funds appearing all years,
and then adds across years.3 The dark bars are the matched survival rates computed using
the probabilities from Proposition 4. In our model survival rates drop o geometrically with
age, while in the data they fall in a more linear fashion. Consequently, we had to choose
which survival probabilities to match. For obvious reasons there is much more data for
younger funds (see Figure 2) which means the early data is estimated much more precisely.
We also found the longer term data puzzling, in that the rates seem to drop linearly. This
may be due to managerial turnover within the mutual fund. That is, good managers might
be promoted, leaving the fund with less talent. To minimize these concerns we chose to
match to the rst ve years of data.
To match the relatively high survival for the rst few years requires that funds begin
operating at a scale that is considerably higher than the size at which they liquidate, with
correspondingly high expectations for managerial ability. The priors are that managers are
expected to earn an annual excess return of 6.5% when they begin operating.
High precision in priors relative to the variability in returns is required to reproduce the
fund-ow and performance relationship. The slope of this relationship is determined by the










































































































Figure 2: Percentage of Surviving Funds: The bars show the fraction of funds as a function
of the number of years in business. Light (red) bars are the actual survival rates computed from
the CRSP mutual fund data base. The dark bars is (blue) what the model predicts the survival
rates should be. The scale is marked on the left hand axis. The line marks the total number of
funds that could have survived at each age. The scale for this line is marked on the right hand
axis.
27fees, f, and the ratio of the precision in priors and returns. Figure 3 provides the explicit
comparison between the model's results and behaviors documented in empirical studies that
we used. In it the ow of funds relationship for two-year old funds is superimposed over the
plot of the non-parametric estimates and 90% condence intervals in Chevalier and Ellison
(1997). The curve from the model seems to pick up the general curvature in the relationship.
A notable discrepancy in this case is that the empirical curve does not seem to go through
the origin, as is required in our model. That is, we would be quite close to the observed
performance-ow relation with a parallel shift of our curve up or to the left. A natural
explanation for this is the general growth in the mutual fund sector during their sample
period, something that is missing in our model.
Figure 3: Flow of Funds: This plot shows the ow of funds for 2 year old funds produced by
the model (using the parameters reported in Table 1) superimposed over the actual ow of funds
plot for these funds as reported in Chevalier and Ellison(1997, Fig.1). Chevalier and Ellison report
the estimated curve (middle line) as well as the 90% condence intervals, the outer lines.
Figure 4 plots the prior distribution over management ability using the inferred parameter
values. It also shows the level of the management fee (1.5%). If level of skill in the economy
is dened as the fraction of managers who can generate an  in excess of the fees they charge,
then this fraction is the area of the curve to the right of the line. About 80% of managers
28satisfy this criteria | they generate value in that they can beat their fees on at least the
rst dollar they manage. Furthermore, the average manager has an  of 6.5%, implying that
he can generate a return of 5% over his fees.
These estimates might appear high, given the skepticism in the academic literature about
whether active managers add value at all. It is a direct consequence, however, of the very high
survival rates and empirically observed ow of funds relationship. Furthermore, the other
parameters implied by these estimates seem reasonable. For example, the implied value of
the ratio
q0
 q (the size of a new fund over the minimum fund size) is 4.7. So, for example, if
the minimum fund size is $5 million, the model implies that new funds would start around
$25 million. At  q = $5 million, (38) implies periodic xed costs F of $75,000. Far from
implying that most managers are unskilled, the data is consistent with a surprisingly high
level of skill amongst active managers.
-0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0.015
Figure 4: Distribution of Management Skill: The vertical line marks the level of the
management fee | 1.5%. Approximately 80% of the area below the curve lies to the right of this
line. The parameter values (mean and precision) are   = 0:065 and  = 277.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we derive a number of empirical predictions of a rational model for active
portfolio management when managerial talent is a scarce resource and is dissipated as the
scale of operations increases. Many of these predictions reproduce empirical regularities that
often have been taken as evidence of investor irrationality or agency costs between managers
and investors. We argue that not only is the rational model consistent with much of the
29empirical evidence, but it is also consistent with a surprisingly high level of skill amongst
active managers.
30Appendix
In this appendix we generalize the example in Section 5 to allow for the possibility that
the amounts of funds that the manager can raise constrains him to not index. We begin by
considering this case, that is, qt such that  q  qt < qc. Using (22) and (23) gives
h(qt) = 1 (51)
c(qt)
h(qt)
= aqt + f: (52)








Recall from (39) that qc =
f
a. Combining this solution with the solution in Section 5 gives
























Using (53), (38) and (39), dene
c  aq
c + f = 2f (56)
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Next we derive the ow of funds equation. There are three new cases not considered
in Section 5 | qt;qt 1  qc, qt 1 < qc < qt and qt < qc < qt 1. We consider each case
individually.
When qt;qt 1  qc, Proposition 2, (54), (55) and (58) after some simplication, yields











The same logic can be used to derive a similar expression in the other cases. When
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Denote the realization of rt that sets qt = qc as rc(t 1). This critical realization is
determined by nding the rt such that the market's posterior on the manager's ability falls
to c. Using equation (25), this value is given by solving:
r
c(t 1) = (c   t 1)h(qt 1)
 + t!
!
















f t 1  c
(65)
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and, following the convention in the main body of the paper, otherwise
qt qt 1(1+rt)
qt 1 =  1.
To generate the empirical distribution we need to aggregate over all funds with the same
age. Using (66), the ow of funds in period t, conditional on the fund being alive in period
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